My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Edmund Husserl’s views on the differences between human and animal consciousness, with particular attention to the experience of temporality.

In the first section, I situate the topic of animal consciousness in the broader context of Husserl’s philosophy. Whereas this connection has been often neglected, I argue that a phenomenological analysis of non-human subjectivities is not only justified, but also essential to the Husserlian project as a whole.

In the second section, I introduce two notions Husserl resorts to when describing the essential difference between human and animal subjectivities, namely “strata of consciousness” and “person.” Drawing on textual evidence, I argue that Husserl does not simply see animals as excluded from the sphere of personhood. Rather, he draws a distinction between two modes of personal life, one of which is said to be unique to human adults.

What holds these two modes apart, according to Husserl, is a subject’s relation to time. In the third section, I delve deeper into this topic, asking how we should understand Husserl’s claim that animals live in a “restricted temporality.” I argue that this has less to do with an inability to remember, imagine, or anticipate future events, and more with an inability to explore temporal horizons stretching before one’s birth or after one’s death. By contrast, humans gradually overcome these limitations during ontogeny, thanks to the practice of linguistic communication. This also has consequences for our capacity to engage in genuinely theoretical thought.

我在这篇论文中的目的是重建埃德蒙·胡塞尔关于人类和动物意识之间差异的观点，特别关注时间性的体验。

在第一部分中，我将动物意识这一主题置于胡塞尔哲学的更广泛背景下。尽管这种联系经常被忽视，但我认为，对非人类主观性的现象学分析不仅是合理的，而且对于整个胡塞尔计划来说也是必不可少的。

第二节介绍胡塞尔在描述人与动物主体性的本质区别时所使用的两个概念，即“意识阶层”和“人” 。根据文本证据，我认为胡塞尔并不仅仅将动物视为被排除在人格领域之外。相反，他区分了两种个人生活模式，其中一种据说是人类成年人所独有的。

在胡塞尔看来，区分这两种模式的是主体与时间的关系。在第三部分中，我将更深入地探讨这个话题，询问我们应该如何理解胡塞尔关于动物生活在“受限时间性”中的主张。我认为，这与无法记住、想象或预测未来事件关系不大，而与无法探索人出生前或人死后的时​​间范围有关。相比之下，由于语言交流的实践，人类在个体发育过程中逐渐克服了这些限制。这也会对我们进行真正的理论思考的能力产生影响。