This work studies for the first time the effect on crime deterrence of variability in punishment under different assumptions on criminals risk preferences. We show that when criminals are risk averse, greater variability in punishment reduces the incentive to commit crimes, and that the opposite holds in the case of risk loving. The linkages between certainty of punishment, initial wealth and the incentive to commit crimes are also analyzed. We then analyze the effects of greater variability in punishment on deterrence policies founded on punishment severity, showing that this effect is positive if criminals are prudent and negative if they are imprudent. Lastly, we analyze for the first time variability in punishment as an instrument of deterrence policy. This analysis determines the optimal level of variability in the two cases of homogeneity and heterogeneity in risk preference.

这项工作首次研究了在对罪犯风险偏好的不同假设下，惩罚的可变性对犯罪威慑的影响。我们表明，当罪犯厌恶风险时，惩罚的更大可变性会降低犯罪动机，而在偏好风险的情况下则相反。还分析了惩罚的确定性、初始财富和犯罪动机之间的联系。然后，我们分析了更大的惩罚可变性对基于惩罚严厉程度的威慑政策的影响，表明如果罪犯谨慎，这种影响是积极的，如果他们不谨慎，这种影响是消极的。最后，我们首次分析了惩罚的可变性作为威慑政策的工具。