Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds.

中文翻译：

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记忆信念薄弱

最近，关于“信念是否弱”，即信念的认知标准是否低于断言或知识的认知标准，存在着广泛的争论。虽然当前大多数研究都集中在“普通信仰”和“彻底信仰”等概念上，但本文旨在通过调查特定类型的信仰来推进这场辩论；记忆信念。有人认为，由于两种形式的“权利不平等”，基于情景记忆形成的（彻底的）信念是“弱的”。因此，我的主要论点是双重的。首先，通过拒绝记忆的认知理论，我认为一个人可以有权相信，但不能有权获得知识。其次，通过仔细审视最近对断言信念规范的辩护，就会发现，只要我们期望言行相符，信念就比断言弱。