In this paper, I discuss, in a Heideggerian context, the possibility of de-subjectivizing the notion of the transcendental time-horizon and reinterpreting it as a formally indicated ‘whereto’ of releasement. The structures of the time-horizon depict the way beings unfold in the fullness of time in their alterity, and they orient the subject’s activity of ‘projection.’ What results is a field-oriented (as opposed to self-oriented) transcendental philosophy which would survive Heidegger’s critique of his own transcendental project, and which would avoid mystification. I take three steps. First, I point out that the problematization of ‘transcendental Heidegger’ is based on the subjectivist interpretation of the time-horizon. I problematize a recent account in the subjectivist vein, arguing that it is neither indispensable, nor very plausible, nor the most illuminative of Heidegger’s work. Second, with the help of Dahlstrom, Golob, Engelland, Sheehan, and Vasterling, I gradually dissociate the notion of the horizon from subjectivism, the visual metaphor, and the assumption of an absolute ground. I suggest instead that the horizonality of the horizon be understood temporally, i.e., as an interplay of presencing and absencing where what matter most are the structures, themselves affected by time, which the transcendental field displays when beings unfold themselves within it. Third, I identify three of those structures when performing a de-subjectivizing reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the threefold synthesis in Kant’s A-Deduction. These structures capture the way every being manifests itself, without themselves being necessarily grounded in the subject’s activity. This gives an example of how transcendental philosophy can clarify what the time-horizon is like while bracketing the question of its provenance.

在本文中，我在海德格尔的语境中讨论了将先验时间范围的概念去主体化并将其重新解释为正式指示的释放“去向”的可能性。时间范围的结构描绘了存在者在时间的充实中以其相异性展开的方式，并且它们为主体的“投射”活动定位。结果是一种以场为导向（相对于以自我为导向）的先验哲学，它将在海德格尔对他自己的先验计划的批判中幸存下来，并且将避免神秘化。我采取三个步骤。首先，我指出“先验海德格尔”的问题化是基于对时间范围的主观主义解释。我以主观主义的方式质疑最近的一个说法，认为它既不是必不可少的，也不是很合理，也不是海德格尔著作中最具启发性的。其次，在 Dahlstrom、Golob、Engelland、Sheehan 和 Vasterling 的帮助下，我逐渐将地平线的概念与主观主义、视觉隐喻和绝对基础假设区分开来。相反，我建议从时​​间上理解地平线的水平性，即作为在场和不在场的相互作用，其中最重要的是自身受时间影响的结构，当存在者在超然场中展现自身时，超然场就会显示出来。第三，在对海德格尔对康德 A 演绎中的三重综合的解释进行去主体化阅读时，我确定了其中的三个结构。这些结构捕捉了每个存在体表现自己的方式，而不必以主体的活动为基础。这给出了一个例子，说明先验哲学如何在将时间范围的起源问题置之不理的同时澄清时间范围是什么样的。