In Campbell and Cosans v the United Kingdom (1982), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) determined that a view must ‘attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ to be considered a religion or belief under Article 9 of the Convention. The Court has seemed hesitant to provide much guidance beyond the words quoted. This article’s first aim is to attempt a comprehensive interpretation of these requirements by examining clues as to their meaning and scope in the case law of the last 40 years. This includes well-known cases like Pretty and Gough, as well as recent cases like Vavřička and De Wilde. The second aim is to evaluate these standards in light of liberal egalitarian principles, specifically, the principle of ‘integrity’ developed by Cécile Laborde. Integrity refers to the value of living in accordance with one’s profound beliefs, which are distinguished from mere preferences and inclinations. The argument presented is that the objective versions of cogency, cohesion, and importance endorsed by the ECtHR are incompatible with the subjectivist value of integrity. Conversely, depending on which of three possible interpretations of seriousness one finds most plausible, the ECtHR’s version of seriousness may align with the integrity view.

中文翻译：

---

说服力、严肃性、凝聚力和重要性：评估关于宗教或信仰的斯特拉斯堡判例法

在 Campbell and Cosans v the United Kingdom (1982) 案中，欧洲人权法院 (ECtHR) 裁定，一种观点必须“达到一定程度的说服力、严肃性、凝聚力和重要性”，才能根据第 9 条被视为宗教或信仰的公约。除了所引用的文字之外，法院似乎对提供更多指导意见犹豫不决。本文的首要目的是通过检查过去 40 年判例法中有关其含义和范围的线索，尝试对这些要求进行全面解释。这包括著名的案例，如 Pretty 和 Gough，以及最近的案例，如 Vavřička 和 De Wilde。第二个目标是根据自由平等主义原则，特别是塞西尔·拉博德提出的“诚信”原则，来评估这些标准。正直是指按照一个人深刻的信念生活的价值，它有别于单纯的偏好和倾向。提出的论点是，ECtHR 认可的客观版本的说服力、凝聚力和重要性与完整性的主观主义价值不相容。相反，根据人们认为对严肃性的三种可能解释中哪一种最合理，ECtHR 的严肃性版本可能与完整性观点一致。