After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.

中文翻译：

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税收、风险承担和金融稳定

全球金融危机后，利用税收增强金融稳定性受到新的关注。本文分析了税收在银行业中的纠正作用，并比较了两种工具，即企业股权补贴（ACE），它可以减轻企业税收中的债务偏差，以及对银行债务的庇古税（银行征税）。我们强调银行资产风险降低所带来的金融稳定收益，并开发了委托代理模型，其中风险承担取决于银行的资本结构，进而取决于债务和股权的税收处理。我们发现（i）ACE 明确地减少了风险承担，（ii）如果银行征税独立于银行绩效，则可以减少风险承担，但否则可能会适得其反，