What determines technology in autocratic regimes? In this paper, I assume that a rent-extracting regime can adopt technology from the global technology frontier, tax-paying citizens can oust the regime, and technology can decrease the ousting cost. I show that a lack of fiscal capacity can increase technology by preventing the ousting constraint from binding. Consistent with this prediction, tax collections and total factor productivity are negatively related in autocratic regimes. Extensions show that natural resources can divorce fiscal revenues from technology, which can encourage technology blocking. However, if technology adoption is socially costly, autocratic regimes can adopt too much technology.

中文翻译：

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专制经济体中的技术采用：财政能力的作用

独裁政权中技术的决定因素是什么？在本文中，我假设抽租政权可以采用全球技术前沿的技术，纳税公民可以推翻该政权，而技术可以降低推翻成本。我表明，缺乏财政能力可以通过防止驱逐约束的约束来增加技术。与这一预测一致的是，在专制政权中，税收和全要素生产率呈负相关。扩展表明，自然资源可以将财政收入与技术分开，这可能会鼓励技术封锁。然而，如果技术采用的社会成本高昂，独裁政权就可能采用过多的技术。