In this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between conceivability and metaphysical necessities, (ii) an apparently plausible principle relating conceivability and epistemic modality, and (iii) the duality of epistemic modalities, one can show the utterly anti-Kripkean result that every metaphysical necessity is an epistemic necessity. My aim is to present and diagnose the problem and evaluate the costs of some possible Kripkean reactions. In particular, I will evaluate the consequences and theoretical costs of rejecting the main ingredients of the argument, namely that we cannot genuinely conceive the negations of metaphysical necessities, that there is no postulated relation between conceivability and epistemic possibility (actually, between unconceivability and epistemic impossibility), and that epistemic possibility and necessity are not dualities.

中文翻译：

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克里普克的可想象性和认知模态

在这篇文章中，我表明（i）从我称之为“克里普克”的可想象性和形而上学必然性之间关系的解释，（ii）一个关于可想象性和认知模态的明显合理的原则，以及（iii）认知模态的二重性，人们可以证明完全反克里普克的结果，即每一种形而上学的必然性都是认识论的必然性。我的目标是提出和诊断问题并评估某些可能的克里普克反应的成本。特别是，我将评估拒绝论证主要成分的后果和理论成本，即我们无法真正设想形而上学必然性的否定，在可想象性和认知可能性之间没有假定的关系（实际上，在不可想象性和认知可能性之间）不可能），