One of the main moral costs of stare decisis lies in the continuous possibility of entrenching morally deficient decisions in the law. Although legal systems usually make provision for dealing with morally deficient precedents, there are cases in which the legal obligation of later courts to follow one of these precedents is undefeated. This possibility affects the overall justification of stare decisis. One traditional answer to this problem consists in accepting this moral cost, on the belief that the benefits of stare decisis outweigh it. On this view, when there is an undefeated legal obligation to follow a morally deficient precedent, the court must simply follow precedent. In this article, I question this approach and defend an alternative solution. I argue that, under some conditions, a court facing a morally deficient precedent should have the power to either follow the precedent or suspend its application to the parties by ordering a temporary stay of proceedings and referring the case to a higher court with power to overrule the precedent. This proposal entails exercising an equitable power recognised by the legal system, which I defend against three possible objections.

遵循先例的主要道德代价之一在于不断有可能在法律中巩固道德上有缺陷的决定。尽管法律制度通常会为处理道德缺陷的先例做出规定，但在某些情况下，后来的法院遵循这些先例之一的法律义务是不败的。这种可能性影响了遵循先例的整体正当性。这个问题的一个传统答案是接受这种道德成本，因为相信遵循先例的好处胜过它。根据这种观点，当存在遵循道德上有缺陷的先例的不败法律义务时，法院必须简单地遵循先例。在本文中，我质疑这种方法并捍卫替代解决方案。我认为，在某些情况下，面对道德上有缺陷的先例的法院应该有权遵循先例或通过命令暂时中止诉讼程序并将案件移交给有权否决的更高一级法院来暂停对当事方的适用先例。该提议需要行使法律制度认可的衡平法权力，我对此提出了三个可能的反对意见。