INTRODUCTION

The response to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 has famously been described as the problem of too-big-to-fail.1 In the middle of a worsening crisis, financial regulators had to recognize that bank bailouts were the only way to stabilize financial markets. One of the two priorities of regulatory reforms post-crisis was to address the too-big-to-fail problem by introducing a resolution procedure for systemically important financial institutions.2 Among financial regulators (with the notable exception of the USA), contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) were seen as a major innovation to address the too-big-to-fail problem and quickly became a popular “bail-in” instrument to facilitate the instant recapitalization of a distressed bank. The quick deleveraging that could be achieved with CoCo conversions would serve the dual roles of recapitalizing “a going-concern bank” and reducing the resolution costs for a “gone concern” bank.

During the press conference on March 19, 2023 the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) announced that, as part of the emergency package in response to the loss of trust and the run on Credit Suisse, the contingent convertible bonds that were part of the Credit Suisse Additional Tier 1 (AT1) regulatory capital had been written off.3 The decision by FINMA took many by surprise and provoked a flood of negative market commentary, with the commonly stated view that conversion violated the priority order of claims between debt and equity. Indeed, in the final rescue deal, the shareholders of Credit Suisse retain around $3 billion of equity value, while the CoCo bond principal write-down amounted to a wipeout of $17 billion for CoCo investors. Implicitly corroborating this commentary, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England, and other regulators made public statements on the Monday following the Credit Suisse deal that they do not intend to follow the FINMA approach and that they intend to respect the usual priority order of claims in resolution.4 How can these divergent views of regulators be reconciled? Why did the Credit Suisse AT1 CoCo bondholders face losses before shareholders were wiped out? What are the lessons for the effectiveness of post-GFC too-big-to-fail reforms? This article provides clarification of these important questions.

中文翻译：

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瑞信CoCo的破产：事实、误解以及金融监管的教训

介绍

众所周知，对 2007-2008 年全球金融危机 (GFC) 的应对措施被描述为“太大而不能倒”的问题。1 在危机不断恶化的过程中，金融监管机构不得不认识到，银行救助是唯一的出路。稳定金融市场的途径。危机后监管改革的两个优先事项之一是通过为具有系统重要性的金融机构引入处置程序来解决“太大而不能倒”的问题。2 在金融监管机构中（美国明显例外），或有可转换债券债券（CoCos）被视为解决“太大而不能倒”问题的一项重大创新，并迅速成为一种流行的“纾困”工具，以促进陷入困境的银行立即进行资本重组。

在 2023 年 3 月 19 日的新闻发布会上，瑞士金融市场监管局 (FINMA) 宣布，作为应对信任丧失和瑞信挤兑的紧急计划的一部分，瑞士金融市场监管局 (FINMA) 的或有可转换债券瑞士信贷额外一级 (AT1) 监管资本已被注销。3 FINMA 的决定令许多人感到惊讶，并引发了大量负面市场评论，普遍认为转换违反了债务与股权之间债权的优先顺序。事实上，在最终的救助协议中，瑞信股东保留了约 30 亿美元的股权价值，而 CoCo 债券本金减记则让 CoCo 投资者损失了 170 亿美元。欧洲中央银行（ECB）、英格兰银行、瑞信交易后的周一，瑞士信贷和其他监管机构发表公开声明，表示他们不打算遵循 FINMA 的做法，而是打算尊重决议中索赔的通常优先顺序。4 如何调和监管机构的这些不同观点？为什么瑞士信贷 AT1 CoCo 债券持有人在股东被消灭之前就面临损失？全球金融危机后“大而不倒”改革的有效性有哪些经验教训？本文对这些重要问题进行了澄清。4 如何调和监管机构的这些不同观点？为什么瑞士信贷 AT1 CoCo 债券持有人在股东被消灭之前就面临损失？全球金融危机后“大而不倒”改革的有效性有哪些经验教训？本文对这些重要问题进行了澄清。4 如何调和监管机构的这些不同观点？为什么瑞士信贷 AT1 CoCo 债券持有人在股东被消灭之前就面临损失？全球金融危机后“大而不倒”改革的有效性有哪些经验教训？本文对这些重要问题进行了澄清。