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Arbitration Effect
American Business Law Journal ( IF 1.743 ) Pub Date : 2023-06-06 , DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12222
Farshad Ghodoosi , Monica M. Sharif

Arbitration is changing the United States justice system. Critics argue that arbitration leads to claim suppression. Proponents argue that, compared with courts, arbitration is cheaper and less formal. These claims have not been empirically tested. In particular, whether and how arbitration impacts individuals’ decision to sue remains an open inquiry. This article for the first time shows, in a series of experiments, the impact of arbitration agreements on individuals' decisions to sue. This article calls it the “arbitration effect.” First, we test whether the arbitration effect exists; that is, if arbitration agreements negatively impact individuals' decision to sue. Second, we experimentally test individuals' decisions to opt out of arbitration agreements. Lastly, we assess whether any type of information can “cure” the arbitration effect. The results establish that individuals are less likely to sue in arbitration as opposed to court, hence the arbitration effect. Such an effect, however, does not exist at the contracting stage, meaning that individuals do not shun arbitration when given the option. Further, none of the fundamental attributes of arbitration, as touted by the U.S. Supreme Court, nor win-rates and class actions mitigate the arbitration effect. Equally, informational nudges do not reduce the effect, and individuals do not ascribe negative attributes to firms forcing mandatory arbitration. For decades, courts and lawmakers grappled with issues related to arbitration. The article provides much-needed data on arbitration. Findings cast serious doubts on the ongoing efforts—market-based, judicial, or regulatory—aiming to change the arbitration course.

中文翻译:

仲裁效力

仲裁正在改变美国的司法系统。批评者认为仲裁会导致索赔压制。支持者认为,与法院相比,仲裁成本更低,也更不正式。这些说法尚未经过实证检验。特别是,仲裁是否以及如何影响个人的起诉决定仍然是一个公开的调查。本文首次通过一系列实验展示了仲裁协议对个人起诉决定的影响。本文称之为“仲裁效应”。首先,我们检验仲裁效果是否存在;也就是说,如果仲裁协议对个人的起诉决定产生负面影响。其次,我们通过实验测试个人选择退出仲裁协议的决定。最后,我们评估是否有任何类型的信息可以“治愈”仲裁效果。结果表明,与法院相比,个人不太可能在仲裁中起诉,因此仲裁效果。然而,这种影响在缔约阶段并不存在,这意味着个人在获得选择权时不会回避仲裁。此外,无论是美国最高法院吹捧的仲裁的基本属性,还是胜诉率和集体诉讼,都不能减轻仲裁的影响。同样,信息推动不会降低效果,个人不会将负面属性归因于强制仲裁的公司。几十年来,法院和立法者一直在努力解决与仲裁有关的问题。这篇文章提供了急需的仲裁数据。调查结果对正在进行的以市场为基础、
更新日期:2023-06-07
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