This paper offers empirical evidence of the role that CEO perquisite compensations (perks) play in a firm’s M&A activities. Using hand-collected panel-data on CEO perks from S&P 500 firms between 2006 and 2014, we find that the M&A deals undertaken by CEOs with high levels of perquisite receive significantly worse market reactions around the announcement period. Further, these deals experience lower post-acquisition abnormal operating and stock performance compared to the deals conducted by CEOs with low levels of perquisite. Firms whose CEOs received greater perquisite also exhibit severe crash risk. Our results are consistent with the widely held negative sentiment toward perquisite compensation.

本文提供了首席执行官额外津贴（津贴）在公司并购活动中所发挥作用的实证证据。通过手工收集 2006 年至 2014 年间标准普尔 500 强企业 CEO 津贴的面板数据，我们发现，在公告期间，由拥有高额津贴的 CEO 进行的并购交易受到的市场反应要差得多。此外，与薪酬水平较低的首席执行官进行的交易相比，这些交易在收购后的异常运营和股票表现较低。首席执行官获得更多津贴的公司也表现出严重的崩盘风险。我们的结果与人们普遍对额外报酬的负面情绪一致。