Borrower-friendly laws, such as recourse restrictions and judicial foreclosures, impose higher costs and risks to lenders. Yet, there is little evidence on how lenders transfer them to borrowers at the mortgage origination. By exploiting the mortgage law heterogeneity across U.S. states, I show that recourse restrictions trigger a collateral channel, through which lenders require a 1.6 to 1.9 percentage points lower loan-to-value ratio to compensate for worse recovery opportunities and respective higher expected loss. This effect holds both before and after the Great Recession, and is robust to a regression discontinuity design approach. I also find that lenders do not penalize strategic defaults when recourse is not allowed. Regarding the impact of judicial requirements, the findings are mixed.

有利于借款人的法律，例如追索权限制和司法取消抵押品赎回权，给贷方带来了更高的成本和风险。然而，几乎没有证据表明贷款人如何在抵押贷款发放时将其转移给借款人。通过利用美国各州抵押贷款法的异质性，我发现追索权限制会触发抵押品渠道，贷款人通过该渠道要求将贷款与价值比率降低 1.6 至 1.9 个百分点，以补偿较差的回收机会和相应较高的预期损失。这种效应在大衰退之前和之后都存在，并且对于回归不连续性设计方法来说是稳健的。我还发现，当不允许追索权时，贷方不会惩罚战略性违约。关于司法要求的影响，调查结果好坏参半。