It has been argued that in the context of Bohm’s approach to quantum mechanics, the postulation of a three-dimensional ontology (as opposed to a high-dimensional one) is presumed to be the only interpretation that may reliably support object-oriented realism by virtue of the fact that this ontology is approximately preserved through scientific change, at least in the classical–quantum transition. Based on an interpretative analysis of the Bohmian formulation, I shall critically evaluate the tenability of this argument. In so doing, I shall argue that this formulation admits the postulation of an alternative ontology that is properly defined in a high-dimensional space, and is approximately preserved among this transition. As a result, both the three-dimensional and the high-dimensional worldviews shall form the basis of an equally reliable endorsement of object-oriented realism in the context of the Bohmian framework. I shall conclude that this argument becomes a problem of metaphysical underdetermination between a three and a high-dimensional Bohmian interpretation.

有人认为，在 Bohm 的量子力学方法的背景下，三维本体论（相对于高维本体论）的假设被认为是唯一可以凭借美德可靠地支持面向对象现实主义的解释事实上，这种本体论通过科学变革大致得以保留，至少在经典-量子转变中是这样。基于对 Bohmian 公式的解释性分析，我将批判性地评估这一论点的站得住脚。这样做时，我将论证这种表述承认了另一种本体论的假设，该本体论在高维空间中得到了适当的定义，并且在这种转变中大致得到了保留。因此，三维世界观和高维世界观都将构成在 Bohmian 框架的背景下同样可靠地支持面向对象的现实主义的基础。我将得出结论，这个论点变成了三维和高维波姆式解释之间形而上学的不确定性问题。