This study uses biform game models to examine firms’ patent deployment strategies that involve a choice between appropriating a patented technology to gain a unique competitive advantage or licensing the technology to a competitor in the product market. It addresses the question of under what circumstances firms use a patent appropriation strategy over a licensing strategy, or vice versa. By incorporating competitive and cooperative settings, this study develops theory and propositions to illustrate the mechanisms by which patent deployment strategies are chosen by an innovator or follower in a product market as a function of the characteristics of innovation, transaction costs, bargaining power, strategic interactions, and other market conditions. This study contributes to the literature by distinguishing between patent appropriability and value appropriation in a transactional network under rivalry. The model and its extensions provide new insights into appropriation strategies for patent portfolios, which are important intellectual assets in a knowledge-based economy.

本研究使用双形式博弈模型来检验公司的专利部署策略，这些策略涉及在盗用专利技术以获得独特的竞争优势或将技术许可给产品市场上的竞争对手之间做出选择。它解决的问题是，在什么情况下公司会使用专利授权策略而不是许可策略，反之亦然。通过结合竞争和合作设置，本研究发展了理论和命题来说明创新者或追随者在产品市场中选择专利部署策略的机制，作为创新特征、交易成本、议价能力、战略互动的函数, 和其他市场条件。本研究通过区分竞争下交易网络中的专利独占性和价值占用，为文献做出了贡献。该模型及其扩展为专利组合的占用策略提供了新的见解，专利组合是知识经济中的重要智力资产。