Like any science marked by high uncertainty, climate science is characterized by a widespread use of expert judgment. In this paper, we first show that, in climate science, expert judgment is used to overcome uncertainty, thus playing a crucial role in the domain and even at times supplanting models. One is left to wonder to what extent it is legitimate to assign expert judgment such a status as an epistemic superiority in the climate context, especially as the production of expert judgment is particularly opaque. To begin answering this question, we highlight the key components of expert judgment. We then argue that the justification for the status and use of expert judgment depends on the competence and the individual subjective features of the expert producing the judgment since expert judgment involves not only the expert's theoretical knowledge and tacit knowledge, but also their intuition and values. This goes against the objective ideal in science and the criteria from social epistemology which largely attempt to remove subjectivity from expertise.

中文翻译：

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气候科学中的专家判断：如何使用以及如何证明其合理性。

与任何具有高度不确定性的科学一样，气候科学的特点是广泛使用专家判断。在本文中，我们首先表明，在气候科学中，专家判断用于克服不确定性，从而在该领域发挥着至关重要的作用，甚至有时取代模型。人们不禁要问，在气候背景下，将专家判断赋予认知优势这样的地位在多大程度上是合法的，特别是在专家判断的产生特别不透明的情况下。为了开始回答这个问题，我们首先强调专家判断的关键组成部分。然后我们认为，专家判断的地位和使用的合理性取决于做出判断的专家的能力和个人主观特征，因为专家判断不仅涉及专家的理论知识和隐性知识，还涉及他们的直觉和价值观。这违背了科学的客观理想和社会认识论的标准，社会认识论很大程度上试图消除专业知识的主观性。