This paper argues that Aristotelian ethical naturalism can combine two commitments that are often held to be incompatible: (a) a commitment to a strong form of ethical objectivity and (b) a thoroughgoing historicism about ethical value. The notions of species and life-form invoked by ethical naturalism do not, I argue, rely upon an ahistorical picture of human nature. I develop this idea by building upon Philippa Foot's defence of ethical naturalism in Natural Goodness. I go on to argue that linguistic changes in the ways we articulate the conditions of human flourishing can be understood, in some cases, as transforming those very conditions.

中文翻译：

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改变我们的本性：伦理自然主义、客观性和历史

本文认为，亚里士多德的伦理自然主义可以结合两个通常被认为是不相容的承诺：（a）对强烈形式的伦理客观性的承诺和（b）关于伦理价值的彻底的历史主义。的概念物种和生命形式我认为，伦理自然主义所援引的理论并不依赖于人性的非历史图景。我通过建立菲利帕·福特 (Philippa Foot) 在《道德自然主义》中对道德自然主义的辩护来发展这一想法。自然善良。我接着认为，在某些情况下，我们表达人类繁荣条件的方式的语言变化可以被理解为改变这些条件。