Bayesian approaches to human cognition have been extensively advocated in the last decades, but sharp objections have been raised too within cognitive science. In this paper, we outline a diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the prevalent strand of Bayesian cognitive science (here labelled pure Bayesian cognitive science), relying on selected illustrations from the psychology of reasoning and tools from the philosophy of science. Bayesians’ reliance on so-called method of rational analysis is a key point of our discussion. We tentatively conclude on a constructive note, though: an appropriately modified variant of Bayesian cognitive science can still be coherently pursued, as some scholars have noted.

过去几十年来，人类认知的贝叶斯方法得到了广泛提倡，但认知科学领域也提出了尖锐的反对意见。在本文中，我们依靠推理心理学的精选插图和科学哲学的工具，概述了贝叶斯认知科学（这里称为纯贝叶斯认知科学）流行趋势的错误诊断。贝叶斯学派对所谓理性分析方法的依赖是我们讨论的一个关键点。不过，我们暂时得出一个建设性的结论：正如一些学者所指出的那样，仍然可以连贯地追求贝叶斯认知科学的适当修改变体。