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Distributive Justice in Collaborative Outputs: Empowering Minority Viewpoints through Deliberation
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory ( IF 6.160 ) Pub Date : 2023-06-21 , DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muad012
Jiho Kim 1
Affiliation  

This article explores how deliberation affects distributive justice for minority view participants in policy decisions made through collaborative governance. It also examines whether the quality of deliberation (i.e., willingness to accept opposing viewpoints) and quantity of deliberation (i.e., length of discussion) can be an effective tool for minority view participants to overcome power imbalances in such collective decision-making processes. I use Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), a computer simulation experiment method, to examine interactions among participants in a collaborative governance arrangement. I develop a series of theoretical propositions based on the simulation results, which are robust to various changes in the parameters and assumptions of the model. First, both the quality and quantity of deliberation may enhance the decision acceptability of participants with minority views. Second, the quality of deliberation may be more effective at empowering underrepresented minority view participants than the quantity of deliberation. Third, the quantity of deliberation may better promote minority views than the quality of deliberation when minority view participants are overrepresented. These findings indicate that interpersonal justice in collaborative processes may enhance distributive justice for minority viewpoints in collaborative outputs, even when procedural justice in the design of collaboration is weakened by an underrepresentation of minority view participants. I conclude with suggestions for future research that can further improve the external validity of the theoretical propositions.

中文翻译:

协作产出中的分配正义:通过审议赋予少数观点权力

本文探讨了协商如何影响少数观点参与者在通过协作治理做出的政策决策中的分配正义。它还检验了审议的质量(即接受相反观点的意愿)和审议的数量(即讨论的长度)是否可以成为少数观点参与者克服此类集体决策过程中权力不平衡的有效工具。我使用基于代理的建模(ABM)(一种计算机模拟实验方法)来检查协作治理安排中参与者之间的交互。我根据模拟结果提出了一系列理论命题,这些命题对于模型参数和假设的各种变化都是稳健的。第一的,审议的质量和数量都可以提高持有少数意见的参与者的决定可接受性。其次,审议的质量可能比审议的数量更有效地赋予代表性不足的少数观点参与者权力。第三,当少数观点参与者的比例过高时,审议的数量可能比审议的质量更好地促进少数观点。这些发现表明,协作过程中的人际正义可能会增强协作产出中少数观点的分配正义,即使协作设计中的程序正义因少数观点参与者代表性不足而被削弱。最后我对未来的研究提出了建议,可以进一步提高理论命题的外部有效性。
更新日期:2023-06-21
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