We analyse a model in which families may either be ‘traditional’ single-earner that care for the child at home or be ‘ modern’ double-earner households that use market child care. Family policies may favour one or the other group, like market care subsidies vs. cash-for-care. Policies are determined by probabilistic voting, where distributional impacts matter, both within and across groups. A higher share of modern households—which can be induced by changes in social norms or by changes in gender wage inequality—may have non-monotone effects, with lower net subsidies to traditional households when their share is very low or very high, and higher subsidies in some intermediate stage. This may explain the implementation of cash-for-care policies and their subsequent tightening in late stages of development, when most voters come from modern households, observed in Norway and Sweden.

我们分析了一个模型，其中家庭可能是在家照顾孩子的“传统”单收入家庭，也可能是使用市场儿童保育的“现代”双收入家庭。家庭政策可能有利于某一群体，例如市场护理补贴与现金换护理。政策是通过概率投票决定的，其中群体内部和群体之间的分配影响都很重要。现代家庭比例的提高——这可能是由社会规范的变化或性别工资不平等的变化引起的——可能会产生非单调效应，当传统家庭的比例非常低或非常高时，对传统家庭的净补贴就会较低，而当传统家庭的比例非常低或非常高时，对传统家庭的净补贴就会较低。中间阶段的补贴。这可以解释以现金换医疗政策的实施以及随后在发展后期的紧缩政策，