Abstract

We investigate whether a universal basic income (UBI) programme should replace New Zealand’s public pension system. A UBI programme would increase the number of social benefit recipients and hence increase tax rates. Not only the basic income itself but also its accompanying tax rate hikes would influence intra- and inter-temporal choices of households. We use an overlapping generations model and show that households’ preferences would be time-inconsistent—in hindsight, households regret having saved too little. There are three major findings of this study. First, the public pension system would be preferred to a UBI programme increasing the tax rate of income. Second, a UBI programme increasing the consumption tax rate would be preferred to the public pension system by households at most ages, but they would reverse the preference later in their lives. Third, a decrease in the population growth rate would make the reversal of the preference more noticeable.

摘要

我们调查全​​民基本收入（UBI）计划是否应该取代新西兰的公共养老金制度。全民基本收入计划将增加社会福利受益者的数量，从而提高税率。不仅基本收入本身，而且随之而来的税率上涨都会影响家庭的内部和外部选择。我们使用代际重叠模型，结果表明家庭的偏好会随时间不一致——事后看来，家庭会后悔储蓄太少。这项研究有三个主要发现。首先，公共养老金制度比提高收入税率的全民基本收入计划更受青睐。其次，对于大多数年龄段的家庭来说，提高消费税率的全民基本收入计划将比公共养老金制度更受青睐。但他们会在以后的生活中扭转这种偏好。第三，人口增长率的下降将使偏好的逆转更加明显。