Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements of Dashtakī's solution—the self-referentiality of the liar sentence and the implicit iteration of the predicate ‘false’—were initially highlighted in two earlier solutions proposed by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1322), respectively. Here I investigate all three solutions and show that Dashtakī's solution can be taken as a synthesis of the other two. None of these solutions seems to be convincing at the end of the day. Nevertheless, all of them include significant logical and philosophical insights. In particular, although Dashtakī's solution is not itself compelling, it is only a few steps away from a promising solution. The appendix to this paper includes translations of the relevant passages.

Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī（卒于 14​​98 年）提出了骗子悖论的解决方案，根据该解决方案，骗子句子是一个自我指涉句子，其中谓词“假”被迭代。在讨论具有谓词“真”和/或“假”的嵌套和迭代实例的句子的真实贴切性条件时，达什塔基认为说谎者的句子根本不贴真。在阿拉伯逻辑传统中，达什塔基解决方案的核心要素——说谎者句子的自指性和谓词“假”的隐式迭代——最初在 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī 提出的两个早期解决方案中得到了强调（分别于 1274 年去世）和沙姆斯·丁·萨马尔罕迪（Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī）（于 1322 年去世）。在这里，我研究了所有三个解决方案，并表明 Dashtakī 的解决方案可以视为其他两个解决方案的综合。归根结底，这些解决方案似乎都没有令人信服的。然而，所有这些都包含重要的逻辑和哲学见解。特别是，尽管 Dashtakī 的解决方案本身并不引人注目，但距离有希望的解决方案仅几步之遥。本文的附录包括相关段落的翻译。