Pleasants has developed the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties, they are best described as universal moral certainties which are natural and nonpropositional, and show unreflectively in the way we act. A clear-cut example is the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Philosophers have levelled three damaging criticisms against Pleasants' proposal by (i) offering counterexamples to his proposed example of moral certainty, (ii) highlighting some disanalogies between moral certainties and Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties and, lastly, (iii) showing the lack of arguments and evidence offered by Pleasants to substantiate the claim that moral certainties are natural. To address these criticisms, Laves has revised Pleasants' proposal by providing numerous amendments. In this paper, I develop some concerns about Laves' proposed amendments and indicate that, at present, they are unable to fully overcome the criticisms levelled against the idea of basic moral certainty. Whether Laves' proposal can escape these troubles demands further attention.

中文翻译：

---

对基本道德确定性理念的一些担忧：对塞缪尔·拉维斯的批评回应

普莱辛斯提出了基本道德确定性的理念。与维特根斯坦的基本经验确定性类似，它们最好被描述为普遍的道德确定性，这些确定性是自然的、非命题的，并且不加反思地表现在我们的行为方式中。一个明显的例子就是杀害无辜者的错误。哲学家们对普莱森特的提议提出了三种破坏性的批评：（i）为他提出的道德确定性例子提供反例，（ii）强调道德确定性与维特根斯坦的基本经验确定性之间的一些不一致，最后，（iii）表明缺乏论证普莱辛特提供的证据证实了道德确定性是自然的这一主张。为了解决这些批评，拉维斯通过提供大量修正案来修改普莱森特的提案。在本文中，我对拉维斯提出的修正案提出了一些担忧，并指出，目前，他们无法完全克服针对基本道德确定性理念的批评。拉维斯的提议能否摆脱这些麻烦还需要进一步关注。