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Behind schedule: The corporate effort to fulfill climate obligations
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2023-06-12 , DOI: 10.1111/jacf.12560
Joseph E. Aldy 1 , Patrick Bolton 2 , Marcin Kacperczyk 2 , Zachery M. Halem 3
Affiliation  

INTRODUCTION

The 2015 Paris Agreement represented the first multilateral agreement to acknowledge and support efforts by so-called non-state actors, including corporations, to cut their greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the goals and structure of the Paris Agreement—focused on limiting warming to well below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels and allowing for national governments to set voluntary emission goals—have informed the setting and adoption of voluntary corporate commitments. Some corporations have taken on “Paris-aligned” emission commitments, indicating that they would deliver emission reductions consistent with the temperature objective of the 2015 agreement. With the increasing adoption of mid-century net-zero emission goals by national governments, some corporates have likewise adopted their own net-zero emission commitments.

Before the Paris Agreement few companies had made commitments to reduce their carbon emissions. Most of them did so through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), which benefited from the momentum generated by the Paris agreement to substantially expand the number of companies that would make decarbonization pledges and voluntarily disclose their carbon emissions. Later, CDP along with the United Nations Global Compact, the World Resources Institute (WRI), and the Worldwide Fund for Nature, founded the Science-Based Target initiative (SBTi) to engage with companies to implement carbon reduction commitments that are aligned with the Paris agreement and the goal of limiting global overheating to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. As Mark Carney had predicted in the run-up to the COP 26 in 2021, “More and more companies—and it will be a tsunami by Glasgow—will have net zero emissions plans.”1 As of this writing, SBTi can boast that “more than 4,000 businesses around the world are already working with the Science-Based Targets initiative.”2

Other major decarbonization drives in the wake of the Paris agreement have emerged in the financial sector, with the launch of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures in 2015, Climate Action 100+ in 2017, the inauguration of the Asset Owners Net-Zero Alliance in 2019 together with the Net Zero Asset Managers Initiative in 2020, and, the culmination of this wave of initiatives, the creation of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero by Mark Carney at the COP 26 in April 2021. In parallel, the Network for Greening the Financial System (now comprising 121 central banks and financial supervisory authorities) was set up in 2017, providing guidance on net zero compatible decarbonization pathways. In short, the Paris agreement has ushered in a new era of decarbonization commitments.

An important aspect of emission reduction commitments is the extent to which they specify interim targets. Commitments are less credible when they specify distant targets and are vague about the pathway toward attaining the target. Businesses cannot decarbonize overnight. Eliminating GHG emissions is inevitably a gradual process, which involves replacing old operating facilities as they depreciate with new facilities powered by renewable energy. The cost of decarbonization can be reduced if this replacement of old with new plants and equipment is spread out over time—hence the net zero targets that are decades away. There is considerable uncertainty over such a long period, which could produce new technological breakthroughs, new green regulations, or new pandemics and wars that disrupt energy supplies. Thus, companies need flexibility and cannot tie themselves to a pathway that is too rigid. On the other hand, the risk of missing the ultimate target is greater if companies do not specify interim milestones.

Many companies that do make commitments to decarbonize do specify such milestones. For these companies we can determine whether they are on track or are falling behind. We also explore how the market reacts when a company falls behind or abandons its commitments mid-course. When we do so, we find little evidence of a backlash.

A case in point is the February 2023 announcement by BP that it would delay its near-term commitment to reduce oil and gas production, changing its 2030 target from a 40% to just a 25% reduction. Despite considerable criticism, BP has so far suffered no negative effects from this move. On the contrary, its stock price increased significantly following its announcement of the change in plans (though likely attributable to concurrently announced soaring oil profits).

To illustrate the implications of the Paris approach through voluntary corporate actions, we frame our analysis through three conceptual interrogations. First, in section “Incentives for Corporations to Adopt Voluntary Commitments” we examine what induces companies to make decarbonization pledges on a voluntary basis. We also study how corporate pledges take account of uncertainty and changing circumstances. In section “What are corporations pledging to do, and how are they”, we show how companies have managed to fulfill their pledges so far, and the extent to which their decarbonization trajectories are consistent with their ultimate targets. In section “The broader commitments landscape: countries, universities”, we look beyond corporate commitments and study the role of commitments by countries, universities, and asset managers. In section “How to handle failing commitments?”, we discuss various ways in which companies and regulators could adjust to the possibility of failing commitments.



中文翻译:

落后于计划:企业履行气候义务的努力

介绍

2015 年《巴黎协定》是第一个承认和支持包括企业在内的所谓非国家行为者为减少温室气体排放所做努力的多边协定。此外,《巴黎协定》的目标和结构——重点是将升温限制在远低于工业化前水平2°C,并允许各国政府设定自愿排放目标——为自愿企业承诺的制定和采用提供了信息。一些企业已经做出了“与巴黎一致”的排放承诺,表明他们将按照 2015 年协议的温度目标实现减排量。随着各国政府越来越多地采用本世纪中叶的净零排放目标,一些企业也同样采用了自己的净零排放承诺。

在《巴黎协定》签署之前,很少有公司做出减少碳排放的承诺。他们中的大多数是通过碳披露项目(CDP)做到这一点的,该项目受益于《巴黎协定》产生的势头,大幅增加了做出脱碳承诺并自愿披露其碳排放量的公司数量。随后,CDP 与联合国全球契约组织、世界资源研究所 (WRI) 和世界自然基金会共同发起了基于科学的目标倡议 (SBTi),与企业合作实施符合《碳减排目标》的碳减排承诺。巴黎协定以及将全球过热限制在工业化前水平以上 2°C 以内的目标。正如马克·卡尼 (Mark Carney) 在 2021 年第 26 届缔约方会议 (COP) 前夕所预测的那样,

《巴黎协定》之后,金融领域出现了其他主要的脱碳举措,包括 2015 年气候相关财务披露工作组的启动、2017 年气候行动 100+ 的启动、资产所有者净零的启动等。 2019 年的联盟与 2020 年的净零资产管理倡议,以及马克·卡尼 (Mark Carney) 在 2021 年 4 月的 COP 26 上创建的格拉斯哥净零资产管理联盟作为这波倡议的高潮。绿色金融体系(现由 121 个中央银行和金融监管机构组成)成立于 2017 年,为净零兼容脱碳路径提供指导。简而言之,《巴黎协定》开启了脱碳承诺的新时代。

减排承诺的一个重要方面是它们指定临时目标的程度。当承诺指定遥远的目标并且对实现目标的途径含糊其辞时,承诺的可信度就会降低。企业不可能一夜之间实现脱碳。消除温室气体排放不可避免地是一个渐进的过程,其中涉及用可再生能源驱动的新设施来更换旧的运营设施,因为它们会贬值。如果随着时间的推移,用新工厂和设备更换旧工厂和设备,脱碳成本就可以降低——因此净零目标需要几十年的时间才能实现。在如此长的时期内存在相当大的不确定性,这可能会产生新的技术突破、新的绿色法规或扰乱能源供应的新的流行病和战争。因此,企业需要灵活性,不能将自己束缚在过于僵化的道路上。另一方面,如果公司不指定中期里程碑,那么错过最终目标的风险就会更大。

许多做出脱碳承诺的公司确实指定了此类里程碑。对于这些公司,我们可以确定它们是走上正轨还是落后。我们还探讨了当一家公司落后或中途放弃承诺时市场的反应。当我们这样做时,我们几乎没有发现强烈反对的证据。

一个典型的例子是英国石油公司 (BP) 于 2023 年 2 月宣布推迟近期减少石油和天然气产量的承诺,将 2030 年的产量目标从 40% 调整为仅减少 25%。尽管受到了相当多的批评,但迄今为止,英国石油公司并未因这一举措而受到任何负面影响。相反,在宣布计划变更后,其股价大幅上涨(尽管可能归因于同时宣布的石油利润飙升)。

为了通过自愿企业行动来说明巴黎方法的影响,我们通过三个概念询问来构建我们的分析。首先,在“企业做出自愿承诺的激励措施”部分,我们研究了是什么促使企业自愿做出脱碳承诺。我们还研究企业承诺如何考虑不确定性和不断变化的情况。在“企业承诺做什么,做得如何”部分,我们展示了企业迄今为止如何履行承诺,以及它们的脱碳轨迹与最终目标的一致程度。在“更广泛的承诺前景:国家、大学”部分”,我们超越企业承诺,研究国家、大学和资产管理公司承诺的作用。在“如何处理失败的承诺?”部分 ,我们讨论了公司和监管机构可以调整以适应失败承诺的可能性的各种方式。

更新日期:2023-06-12
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