Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as colour. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates the problem of qualities to physical objects in the environment, given that such qualities cannot be derived from the non-qualitative properties of objects, and it does not resolve the problem of consciousness either. I argue that such an outcome is welcome: if the physical world is full of explanatory gaps, then the mind–body explanatory gap is not so special. Moreover, the explanatory gaps regarding qualities of objects are less puzzling than the brain-qualia gap. In order to counter the usual worries concerning realism about objective qualities, I introduce ‘imperfect realism’ as an alternative to colour pluralism and complex reductionism, which accommodates realism in the face of widespread perceptual error. I conclude with a discussion of how this ‘multiple-gaps view’ sits better with a naturalistic framework compared to the Galilean-Cartesian account of qualities.

中文翻译：

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通过增加解释差距来解决意识难题

最近的哲学看到了对颜色等感性品质的现实主义观点的复兴。该观点认为，体验到的品质是物理环境中物体的属性，而不是心理实例化的属性，如感受性或仅仅是有意的、虚幻的属性。一些人认为，这一举措消除了物理特性和意识的定性特征之间的解释差距。另一些人则说，它只是将质量问题重新定位到环境中的物理物体上，因为这些质量不能从物体的非质量属性中得出，而且它也没有解决意识问题。我认为这样的结果是值得欢迎的：如果物理世界充满了解释性差距，那么身心解释性差距就不那么特别了。此外，关于物体品质的解释差距不像大脑-品质差距那样令人费解。为了反驳现实主义对客观品质的常见担忧，我引入“不完美现实主义”作为色彩多元化和复杂还原论的替代方案，在面对普遍的感知错误时适应现实主义。最后，我讨论了与伽利略-笛卡尔质量解释相比，这种“多重差距观点”如何更好地适应自然主义框架。