Over the past decade, the Five Eyes Intelligence community has argued cryptosystems with end-to-end encryption (E2EE) are disrupting the acquisition and analysis of digital evidence. They have labelled this phenomenon the ‘problem of going dark’. Consequently, several jurisdictions have passed ‘responsible encryption’ laws that limit access to E2EE. Based upon a rhetorical analysis (Cunningham in Understanding rhetoric: a guide to critical reading and argumentation, BrownWalker Press, Boca Raton, 2018) of official statements about ‘going dark’, it is argued there is a need for a domain-specific principle of cryptographic justice to reorient the debate away from competing technocratic claims about the necessity, proportionality, and accountability of digital surveillance programs. This article therefore specifies a principle of cryptographic justice by adapting more general norms of information justice to decision-making about encryption law and policy. The resulting principle is that encryption laws and policies should be designed to empower the comparatively powerless to protect themselves from domination (i.e., morally arbitrary forms of surveillance). It is argued this principle can reorient decision-making about encryption law and policy towards consideration of how cryptography impacts systems-level power dynamics within information societies.

在过去的十年中，五眼情报界认为具有端到端加密 (E2EE) 的密码系统正在破坏数字证据的获取和分析。他们将这种现象称为“变暗问题”。因此，一些司法管辖区已经通过了限制对 E2EE 访问的“负责任的加密”法律。基于对有关“走向黑暗”的官方声明的修辞分析（Cunningham 的《理解修辞：批判性阅读和论证指南》，BrownWalker Press，博卡拉顿，2018 年），有人认为需要制定特定领域的原则密码正义重新调整辩论方向，使其远离关于数字监控计划的必要性、相称性和问责制的相互竞争的技术官僚主张。因此，本文通过将更通用的信息正义规范应用于加密法律和政策的决策来明确密码正义的原则。由此产生的原则是，加密法律和政策的设计应使相对无能为力的人能够保护自己免受统治（即道德上任意形式的监视）。有人认为，这一原则可以重新调整有关加密法律和政策的决策，以考虑密码学如何影响信息社会中系统级的权力动态。