The Experimental Philosophy (“X-Phi”) movement applies the methodology of empirical sciences – most commonly empirical psychology – to traditional philosophical questions. In its radical, “negative” form, X-Phi uses the resulting empirical data to cast doubt on the reliability of common philosophical methods, arguing for radical reform of philosophical methodology.

In this paper I develop two connected methodological worries about this second enterprise. The first concerns the data elicited by questionnaires and other empirical survey methods; recent work in political science suggests that such surveys frequently do not elicit the participants’ candid judgements, but rather their expressions of certain attitudes and identifications. This possibility stymies the arguments from experimental data to a radical overhaul of philosophical methodology. The second builds on recent work by L.A. Paul and Kieran Healy concerning social science methodology, applying it to the use of those methods in X-Phi. It concerns experimental design where the treatment investigated is a “transformative” one; since a philosophical education is plausibly one such treatment, doubt is cast on any claim that apparent differences between the judgements of philosophers and ordinary folk has implications for philosophical methodology.

实验哲学（“X-Phi”）运动将经验科学（最常见的是经验心理学）的方法论应用于传统哲学问题。X-Phi 以激进的“消极”形式，利用由此产生的经验数据对常见哲学方法的可靠性提出质疑，主张对哲学方法进行彻底改革。

在本文中，我对这第二个企业提出了两个相互关联的方法论担忧。第一个涉及通过问卷调查和其他实证调查方法获得的数据；最近的政治学研究表明，此类调查常常不会引起参与者的坦率判断，而是他们表达某些态度和认同。这种可能性阻碍了从实验数据到哲学方法论彻底改革的争论。第二个基于 LA Paul 和 Kieran Healy 最近关于社会科学方法论的工作，并将其应用于 X-Phi 中这些方法的使用。它涉及实验设计，其中所研究的治疗方法是一种“变革性”治疗方法；因为哲学教育似乎是这样的一种治疗方法，