This paper analyzes how differences in countries’ preferences for public goods affect the stability of coalitions. In a three-country framework, we show how heterogeneity in public goods preferences can shape countries’ decisions to sign up for capital tax rate harmonization agreements (partial or full). In the context of asymmetric preferences, we identify situations in which these discrepancies make harmonization either cost-effective or harmful. We find that countries with similar preferences have an incentive to commit to capital tax harmonization. However, partial harmonization is only stable if the difference in preferences with the outsider is relatively large. A sufficiently high level of capital supply is also required to limit the effects of tax competition on the outsider.

本文分析了各国对公共产品偏好的差异如何影响联盟的稳定性。在三个国家的框架中，我们展示了公共产品偏好的异质性如何影响各国签署资本税率统一协议（部分或全部）的决定。在偏好不对称的背景下，我们确定了这些差异使得协调要么具有成本效益，要么有害的情况。我们发现具有类似优惠的国家有动力致力于资本税统一。然而，只有当与外界的偏好差异较大时，部分协调才是稳定的。还需要足够高水平的资本供应来限制税收竞争对外部人的影响。