In the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, a section of the Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) ostensibly provided greater protection to low-income borrowers by capping bank charges on small dollar mortgages (defined here as less than $100,000) and requiring more bank oversight by outside auditors. Previous research has shown that both actions had the perverse consequence of reducing the availability of mortgage credit to low-income borrowers. Building on these findings, we investigate the following question: Did the decline in access to credit lead to a decrease in demand for homes in high poverty census tracts, and a corresponding decline in property values in these areas? Using an OLS regression model of home values and census tract data in Forsyth County, North Carolina from 2007 to 2020, we calculate that nominal home values dropped by over 40% in the county’s lowest income census tracts after the institution of the DFA, relative to the rest of the county. Our paper offers evidence that DFA has harmed those that the Act was intended to help.

2008 年经济大衰退之后，《多德弗兰克法案》(DFA) 的一部分通过限制银行对小额抵押贷款（此处定义为低于 100,000 美元）的收费并要求加强银行监管，表面上为低收入借款人提供了更大的保护由外部审计师。先前的研究表明，这两种行为都会产生不良后果，即减少低收入借款人获得抵押信贷的机会。基于这些发现，我们调查了以下问题：获得信贷的机会减少是否导致高贫困人口普查地区的住房需求减少，以及这些地区的房产价值相应下降？使用 2007 年至 2020 年北卡罗来纳州福赛斯县房屋价值和人口普查区数据的 OLS 回归模型，我们计算出，在 DFA 建立后，该县最低收入人口普查区的名义房屋价值相对于该县其他地区下降了 40% 以上。我们的论文提供的证据表明 DFA 伤害了该法案旨在帮助的人。