This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity for the government to design an optimal policy aimed at incentivising R&D disclosure. Following this welfare-improving path, sharing R&D-related information becomes a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium strategy. These findings suggest that using public subsidies to R&D disclosure can lead to a win-win result, eliminating the unpleasant non-disclosing outcome from a societal perspective.

本文提出了一个三阶段的非合作披露决策博弈（DDG），其中研发投资公司在类似古诺的环境中选择是否向竞争对手披露研发相关信息。尽管企业没有（私人）动机单方面披露有关其降低成本的研发活动的信息，以防止竞争对手进行无偿拨款，但这项工作揭示了政府设计旨在激励研发披露的最佳政策的机会。遵循这条福利改善路径，共享研发相关信息成为帕累托有效的纳什均衡策略。这些发现表明，利用公共补贴进行研发披露可以带来双赢的结果，从社会角度消除不披露的不愉快结果。