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The role of personal and impersonal relational contracts on partner selection and efficiency
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization ( IF 1.324 ) Pub Date : 2023-07-05 , DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad011
Manuel Muñoz-Herrera 1 , Ernesto Reuben 1, 2
Affiliation  

In this article, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of relational contracts on market efficiency in environments with different degrees of contract enforceability and market competition. By exogenously varying the communication protocol, we create relational contracts that are more personal or impersonal. On the one hand, personal relational contracts improve efficiency by promoting trust and coordination. On the other hand, impersonal relational contracts increase efficiency by facilitating the severance of trading relationships when more productive competitors enter the market. Therefore, the overall effect on market efficiency depends on the relative importance of competition and agreement enforceability (JEL D91, L22, L14).

中文翻译:

个人和非个人关系契约对合作伙伴选择和效率的作用

在本文中,我们通过实验室实验来研究在不同程度的契约可执行性和市场竞争的环境中关系契约对市场效率的影响。通过外在地改变通信协议,我们创建了更加个人化或非个人化的关系契约。一方面,个人关系契约通过促进信任和协调来提高效率。另一方面,当生产力更高的竞争对手进入市场时,非个人关系契约可以促进贸易关系的切断,从而提高效率。因此,对市场效率的总体影响取决于竞争和协议可执行性的相对重要性(JEL D91、L22、L14)。
更新日期:2023-07-05
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