We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two-sided markets when below-cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying-good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying to directly capture the large advertising revenue created in the complementary segment. We uncover two distinct mechanisms by which tying raises monopoly profits but reduces social welfare. Our theory of tying can be applied to real-world antitrust law enforcement, such as the Google Android case.

中文翻译：

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通过异构广告收入和负定价捆绑双边市场

当低于成本或负定价可能时，我们提出了双边市场中反竞争搭售的理论。由于两个消费群体并存（一个将搭售和搭售商品视为互补，另一个将其视为独立），搭售行为的垄断者可能会面临分售下提取租金的困难，并希望利用搭售直接获取所创造的巨额广告收入。在互补部分。我们发现搭售可以提高垄断利润但降低社会福利的两种不同机制。我们的搭售理论可以应用于现实世界的反垄断执法，例如谷歌安卓案。