当前位置: X-MOL 学术Journal of Public Economic Theory › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Sovereign debt assistance and democratic decision-making
Journal of Public Economic Theory ( IF 1.336 ) Pub Date : 2023-06-29 , DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12656
Ruth Ben‐Yashar 1 , Miriam Krausz 2 , Shmuel Nitzan 1
Affiliation  

Organizational reforms stimulating democratic decision-making play a role in the economic effectiveness of concessional debt and debt relief. Effectiveness is defined as the increase in project approval produced by debt assistance. This claim is supported by a theoretic model illustrating the role of democratic decision-making in increasing lending as well as in determining the effectiveness of debt assistance. Using the framework of group decision-making in a fixed-size committee, we suggest a novel explanation to the advantage of conditioning debt assistance on organizational reforms that target the decision-making structure in organizations. The results imply that if the aid organization can affect the level of democratization in organizations, it can exploit its advantage and set the debt assistance that induces the maximal increase in project approval. We derive conditions under which organizational reforms that impose various forms of democratic norms in decision-making are important for increasing the effectiveness of debt assistance. We also point to the case where replacing an autocratic decision maker can cause debt assistance effectiveness to decline.

中文翻译:

主权债务援助和民主决策

刺激民主决策的组织改革对优惠债务和债务减免的经济有效性发挥着作用。有效性的定义是债务援助带来的项目批准增加。这一主张得到了一个理论模型的支持,该模型说明了民主决策在增加贷款以及确定债务援助有效性方面的作用。利用固定规模委员会中的集体决策框架,我们提出了一种新颖的解释,以说明将债务援助置于针对组织决策结构的组织改革的条件下。结果表明,如果援助组织能够影响组织的民主化水平,它可以利用自己的优势并设定债务援助,从而最大限度地增加项目批准。我们得出了一些条件,在这些条件下,在决策过程中实施各种形式的民主规范的组织改革对于提高债务援助的有效性非常重要。我们还指出了更换专制决策者可能导致债务援助有效性下降的情况。
更新日期:2023-06-29
down
wechat
bug