The Gamer’s Dilemma consists of three intuitively plausible but conflicting assertions: (i) Virtual murder is morally permissible. (ii) Virtual child molestation is morally forbidden. (iii) There is no relevant moral difference between virtual murder and virtual child molestation in computer games. Numerous attempts to resolve (or dissolve) the Gamer’s Dilemma line the field of computer game ethics. Mostly, the phenomenon is approached using expressivist argumentation: Reprehensible virtual actions express something immoral in their performance but are not immoral by themselves. Consequentialists, on the other hand, claim that the immorality of virtual actions arises from their harmful consequences. I argue that both approaches have serious difficulties meeting the moral challenge posed by the Gamer’s Dilemma. They tend to confuse the morality of in-game actions either with the morality of their real-world counterparts or with the morality of games as objects. Following this critical analysis, I will develop a Kantian argument and defend it against two objections. So far, deontological responses to the Gamer’s Dilemma have been sought in vain. Yet, with Kant, its moral challenge can be met by looking at the gamer’s reasons. From this perspective, the Gamer’s Dilemma is based on a false assumption: the moral status of gaming acts does not derive from a normative equation with their real-world counterparts but only from their justifications.

玩家困境由三个直观上合理但相互矛盾的断言组成：(i) 虚拟谋杀在道德上是允许的。(ii) 虚拟儿童猥亵行为在道德上是被禁止的。(iii) 电脑游戏中的虚拟谋杀和虚拟儿童猥亵之间不存在相关的道德差异。计算机游戏伦理领域有许多解决（或消除）玩家困境的尝试。大多数情况下，这种现象是使用表现主义论证来处理的：应受谴责的虚拟行为表达了他们的行为中有不道德的事情，但其本身并不是不道德的。另一方面，结果主义者声称虚拟行为的不道德源于其有害后果。我认为这两种方法都很难应对玩家困境带来的道德挑战。他们倾向于将游戏中行为的道德与现实世界的道德相混淆，或者与游戏作为对象的道德相混淆。在这种批判性分析之后，我将提出一个康德式的论证，并针对两个反对意见对其进行辩护。到目前为止，对玩家困境的义务论回应一直徒劳无功。然而，对于康德来说，它的道德挑战可以通过审视游戏玩家的原因来应对。从这个角度来看，玩家困境是基于一个错误的假设：