Abstract

When crises occur between nuclear-armed states, do relative nuclear capabilities affect the outcome? The literature offers no consensus about nuclear superiority’s effect on crisis victory, but this article demonstrates that this effect depends on the size of the disparity between states’ nuclear arsenals. Although superiority is correlated with victory in crises between states with similarly sized nuclear arsenals, superiority provides no advantage in asymmetric crises. Because a vastly inferior state risks annihilation in a nuclear conflict, it will acquiesce to an opponent’s demands before the crisis occurs, unless backing down implies an existential threat as well. Given an asymmetric crisis has emerged, therefore, the inferior side will be willing to bid up the risk of nuclear war, deterring superior opponents. Using quantitative analyses of crisis data, this article shows that the positive association between nuclear superiority and crisis victory decreases as the disparity between competing states’ arsenals increases.

摘要

当拥核国家之间发生危机时，相对核能力会影响结果吗？关于核优势对危机胜利的影响，文献尚未达成共识，但本文表明，这种影响取决于各国核武库之间的差距大小。尽管核武库规模相似的国家之间的优势与危机中的胜利相关，但在不对称危机中，优势并没有提供任何优势。由于一个处于劣势的国家在核冲突中面临着被消灭的风险，因此它会在危机发生之前默许对手的要求，除非退缩也意味着存在的威胁。因此，在不对称危机出现的情况下，劣势一方会愿意抬高核战争的风险，威慑优势对手。