Are business groups more likely to commit financial fraud when they are politically connected? Many past studies and anecdotal evidence have pointed out that business groups may behave more opportunistically when they are politically connected. However, the nature of the business group-government relationship evolves amid governance reform in many countries, making it difficult for business groups to abuse their political connections. In this research, we examine the business group-government relationship through the lens of social exchange and find a deterring effect of political connections on a connected business group’s propensity to commit fraud. Our results indicate that business groups are less likely to commit financial fraud when the extent of their political connection is high. By doing so, politically connected firms can prove themselves as legitimate business partners for the government and can more effectively secure a position to leverage their political connections. We additionally find that such an exchange relationship is weakened under a business group-unfriendly government due to their hostile relationships.

当商业团体有政治联系时，他们是否更有可能实施财务欺诈？过去的许多研究和轶事证据都指出，商业团体在有政治联系时可能会表现出更多的机会主义行为。然而，随着许多国家的治理改革，企业集团与政府关系的性质发生了变化，这使得企业集团很难滥用其政治关系。在这项研究中，我们从社会交换的角度审视了商业集团与政府的关系，并发现政治关系对相关商业集团的欺诈倾向具有威慑作用。我们的研究结果表明，当商业团体的政治联系程度较高时，他们实施财务欺诈的可能性较小。通过这样做，有政治联系的公司可以证明自己是政府的合法商业伙伴，并且可以更有效地获得利用其政治关系的地位。我们还发现，在对企业集团不友好的政府的领导下，由于企业集团之间的敌对关系，这种交换关系会被削弱。