ABSTRACT

This paper examines the narrative turn in decolonial theory, specifically regarding the use of experience as sources for normative theories. While narratives of experience can challenge claims of universality, they alone cannot provide broader normative criteria that extend beyond specific experiences, making their use as moral justification ambiguous. Before seeking criteria for moral justification, it is essential to examine the epistemic contribution of experience-based discourse, such as standpoint theories and the Brazilian concept of “lugar de fala” (place of speech). Instead of relying solely on experience, the paper argues for an epistemic critique of the socially shared vocabulary that precedes these experiences. The paper proposes that a more productive approach lies in identifying blind spots in our concept of injustice and examining the vocabulary that shapes our disposition to feel and narrate experiences. This critique challenges the limitations of relying solely on identity for moral justification, emphasising the importance of collective understanding and the need for a broader framework. By expanding this vocabulary, alternative ways of being affected and describing forms of life can be explored.

摘要

本文探讨了非殖民理论的叙事转向，特别是关于使用经验作为规范理论的来源。虽然经验叙述可以挑战普遍性的主张，但它们本身无法提供超越特定经验的更广泛的规范标准，从而使其作为道德正当性的用途变得模糊不清。在寻求道德正当性的标准之前，有必要检查基于经验的话语的认知贡献，例如立场理论和巴西的“lugar de fala”（演讲地点）概念。本文主张对这些经历之前的社会共享词汇进行认知批判，而不是仅仅依赖经验。该论文提出，更有效的方法在于找出我们关于不公正的概念中的盲点，并检查塑造我们感受和叙述经历的倾向的词汇。这种批评挑战了仅仅依靠身份来进行道德辩护的局限性，强调了集体理解的重要性以及对更广泛框架的需要。通过扩大词汇量，可以探索受影响和描述生命形式的替代方式。