Did policy interventions contribute to the gradual segmentation of lending markets starting with the 2007 - 2008 global financial crisis? We investigate this question in an international Cournot duopoly model with equity constraints. Two symmetric multinational banks compete for corporate lending via local affiliates in two separate national lending markets. Their credit risk in each market is determined by their choice of monitoring effort, which is more costly for foreign lending. Under a binding equity constraint, our model predicts the following: Shocks to bank equity, regulatory standards and monetary policy, such as occurred during and after the crisis, increase the lending home bias of multinational banks. We interpret this retrenchment as a flight to informationally closer or better understood lending. Our results under a non-binding equity constraint are largely identical.

自 2007 年至 2008 年全球金融危机以来，政策干预是否导致了贷款市场的逐步分割？我们在具有股权约束的国际古诺双头垄断模型中研究了这个问题。两家对称的跨国银行通过当地分支机构在两个不同的国家贷款市场竞争企业贷款。他们在每个市场的信用风险取决于他们选择的监管努力，这对于外国贷款来说成本更高。在具有约束力的股权约束下，我们的模型预测如下：银行股权、监管标准和货币政策的冲击（例如危机期间和危机后发生的冲击）会增加跨国银行的贷款国偏好。我们将这种紧缩解释为转向信息更接近或更容易理解的贷款。