I examine whether company-implemented disclosure committees help to improve non-GAAP reporting quality. I find that firms with disclosure committees provide higher quality non-GAAP performance metrics and that the exclusions used to calculate their non-GAAP numbers are less persistent for future operating income and operating cash flows. Moreover, I find that firms with disclosure committees are less likely to receive SEC comment letters about non-GAAP disclosure. For firms that receive comment letters about non-GAAP reporting, disclosure committees can help to improve non-GAAP reporting quality. Comparing the influence of audit committees and disclosure committees, I find that audit committee financial experts have stronger monitoring effects than those on disclosure committees. Meanwhile, legal experts on disclosure committees provide similar monitoring compared to audit committees’ financial experts. Finally, the interaction between audit committee financial experts and disclosure committee legal experts produces the strongest effect on non-GAAP reporting quality. In sum, my analyses suggest that disclosure committees can provide important monitoring of non-GAAP reporting.

我研究了公司设立的披露委员会是否有助于提高非公认会计原则报告质量。我发现设有披露委员会的公司提供了更高质量的非公认会计准则绩效指标，并且用于计算其非公认会计准则数据的排除项对于未来营业收入和营业现金流的持久性较差。此外，我发现设有披露委员会的公司不太可能收到美国证券交易委员会关于非公认会计准则披露的评论信。对于收到有关非公认会计原则报告的评论信的公司，披露委员会可以帮助提高非公认会计原则报告的质量。比较审计委员会和披露委员会的影响力，我发现审计委员会的财务专家比披露委员会的财务专家具有更强的监督作用。同时，与审计委员会的财务专家相比，披露委员会的法律专家提供类似的监督。最后，审计委员会财务专家和披露委员会法律专家之间的互动对非公认会计准则报告质量产生最强烈的影响。总之，我的分析表明，披露委员会可以对非公认会计准则报告提供重要的监督。