We extend Stiglitz (J Public Econ, 17, 213–240,1982) to a dynamic and stochastic optimal taxation model, while assessing the effects of exogenous wage regulations. We show that when wage regulations are imposed, consumption inequality rises more than when they are removed. The results lead to an important policy implication that in the face of exogenous wage regulations, the social planner who can design optimal tax schedule prefers to widen the consumption inequality. From this perspective, the drive to enhance production efficiency outweighs the motivation for redistribution. A conventional wisdom that full employment commitment and minimum wage legislation should serve as a buffer for the minority may not be taken for granted. In the qualitative analysis, we find that as wage regulations tighten, the lower bound of the marginal tax rate on capital rises. Our quantitative result validates that, showing that the marginal tax rate on capital increases to varying degrees in response to wage requirements of varying tightness.

我们将 Stiglitz (J Public Econ, 17, 213–240,1982) 扩展到动态随机最优税收模型，同时评估外生工资监管的影响。我们的研究表明，实施工资管制时，消费不平等的加剧程度比取消工资管制时还要大。结果得出一个重要的政策含义：面对外生工资调节，能够设计最优税收计划的社会规划者倾向于扩大消费不平等。从这个角度来看，提高生产效率的动力大于再分配的动力。传统观点认为，充分就业承诺和最低工资立法应该为少数群体提供缓冲，但这一传统观点可能并不被认为是理所当然的。在定性分析中，我们发现随着工资法规的收紧，资本边际税率下限上升。我们的定量结果证实了这一点，表明资本边际税率随着不同紧缩程度的工资要求而不同程度地增加。