ABSTRACT

In many polluting industries, firms with high environmental quality (HEQ) products often license their new environmental technology to firms with low environmental quality (LEQ) products. After accepting the licensing arrangement, firms with LEQ products can produce both the HEQ and LEQ products and compete with the licensor. What type of licensing mode is optimal under such circumstance becomes an interesting question and warrants analysis. To analyze this issue, we construct a vertical product differentiation duopoly model with multi-product competition. The results show that two-part tariff licensing is always the optimal strategy for the licensor, and it is the optimal licensing strategy as well to improve the environment and social welfare only when the degree of product environmental quality differentiation is relatively high.

摘要

在许多污染行业中，拥有高环境质量（HEQ）产品的企业经常将其新环保技术许可给低环境质量（LEQ）产品的企业。接受许可安排后，拥有LEQ产品的企业可以同时生产HEQ和LEQ产品并与许可人竞争。在这种情况下，哪种许可模式是最佳的，成为一个有趣的问题，值得分析。为了分析这个问题，我们构建了一个多产品竞争的垂直产品差异化双寡头垄断模型。结果表明，两部分关税许可始终是许可方的最优策略，并且只有当产品环境质量差异化程度较高时，才是改善环境和社会福利的最优许可策略。