This article examines competing economic theories of crime and punishment within a common analytical framework. The theories—due to Becker (1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 76 Journal of Political Economy 169–217), Posner (1985. “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law” 85 Columbia Law Review 1193–231), and Adelstein (1981. “Institutional Structure and Evolution in the Criminal Process,” 76 Northwestern University Law Review 1–99)—share the view of crime as exchange, but differ in the interpretation of punishment; specifically, is it aimed at pricing crime, preventing crime, or achieving corrective justice? The hybrid model used to address this question, originally developed by Hylton (2005. “The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law,” 1 Review of Law and Economics 175–201), explicitly incorporates market exchange as an alternative to criminal exchange. The results show that the optimal enforcement policy generally involves maximal punishment (however that is defined), but the optimal probability of apprehension can be high or low, depending on the parameters of the model. In the latter case, crime may completely crowd out the market. (JEL K14, K42)

中文翻译：

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论刑事处罚的经济理论：定价、预防还是比例？

本文在一个共同的分析框架内研究了有关犯罪和惩罚的相互竞争的经济理论。这些理论源于 Becker (1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, 76 Journal of Political Economy 169–217)、Posner (1985. “An Economic Theory of the Crime Law” 85 Columbia Law Review 1193–231) ，和阿德尔斯坦（1981。“刑事诉讼过程中的制度结构和演变”，76 西北大学法律评论 1-99）——同意犯罪是交换的观点，但对惩罚的解释不同；具体来说，它的目的是定价犯罪、预防犯罪还是实现矫正正义？用于解决这个问题的混合模型最初由 Hylton 开发（2005 年。“刑罚理论和刑法经济学”，1 Review of Law and Economics 175-201），明确将市场交换作为犯罪交换的替代方案。结果表明，最优执行政策通常涉及最大惩罚（无论其定义如何），但最优逮捕概率可能高或低，具体取决于模型的参数。在后一种情况下，犯罪可能会完全挤出市场。（杰尔 K14、K42）