Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.

中文翻译：

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中介动态合约：运营、治理和金融工程

私募股权为中间投资提供资金，并通过积极参与运营、治理和金融工程来影响投资组合公司的业绩。我们在动态代理模型中研究这种类型的中介，在该模型中，活跃的中介机构从外部投资者那里筹集资金并投资于由代理人经营的公司。最优契约解决了中介和公司层面的道德风险。中介人影响公司业绩的激励在业绩不佳后最强，而代理人影响公司业绩的激励在业绩良好后最强。我们还展示了金融工程，即与外部投资者的金融合同，如何与运营和治理工程相互作用。