This study examines War’s Inefficiency Puzzle in a resource bargaining model, where the nature of the resource (e.g., water or land) can influence resource division valuation. In the model, an embedded resource conflict or contest model equilibrium constitutes the disagreement point. We first show that the Puzzle holds across all winner-take-all conflict forms in a generalized family given a standard bargaining (in the shadow of conflict) framework. When introducing resource division discounts, we find conditions in which a bargaining solution does not exist such that conflict is chosen over settlement. Resource division discounts can cause conflict to be chosen over any settlement point in the feasible set, thus providing a solution to War’s Inefficiency Puzzle. This solution does not assume that a resource cannot be divided. It only assumes that division may lead to division discounts. We then consider a generalization of a classic tragedy of the commons model and find that division of an innate commons leads to division discounts as an equilibrium outcome.

本研究探讨了资源讨价还价模型中的战争低效率之谜，其中资源的性质（例如水或土地）会影响资源分配的估值。在模型中，嵌入的资源冲突或竞争模型均衡构成了分歧点。我们首先证明，在给定标准讨价还价（在冲突的阴影下）框架的情况下，该难题适用于广义家庭中所有赢家通吃的冲突形式。当引入资源分配折扣时，我们发现不存在讨价还价解决方案的情况，因此选择冲突而不是解决。资源划分折扣可以导致冲突被选择在可行集合中的任何结算点上，从而为战争低效率难题提供了解决方案。该解决方案不假设资源不可分割。它仅假设分部可能会导致分部折扣。然后，我们考虑经典公地悲剧模型的概括，发现先天公地的划分会导致划分折扣，作为均衡结果。