I study incentives for communication and policymaking in the presence of information asymmetry and constraints on the set of feasible policies. An informed and an uninformed agent both take decisions in a coordination game such that their actions exhibit positive spillover and are imperfectly substitutable. When agents communicate via cheap talk prior to the coordination stage, there is full information revelation as long as constraints are not binding. When constraints bind, communication results in threshold equilibria and partial revelation of information. The most informative threshold equilibrium maximizes the welfare of both agents. This paper is the first in the literature to establish a relationship between action constraints and incentives for strategic communication.

我研究在信息不对称和可行政策受到限制的情况下沟通和政策制定的激励因素。知情主体和不知情主体都在协调博弈中做出决策，使得他们的行为表现出积极的溢出效应并且是不完全可替代的。当代理在协调阶段之前通过廉价谈话进行沟通时，只要约束不具有约束力，就会有完整的信息揭示。当约束约束时，沟通会导致阈值平衡和信息的部分揭示。信息最丰富的阈值均衡使双方的福利最大化。本文是文献中第一篇建立战略沟通的行动约束和激励之间关系的论文。