‘Reductive Evidentialism’ seeks to explain away all ‘structural’ requirements of rationality—including norms of logical coherence—in terms of ‘substantive’ norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain its central tenet that an individual’s body of evidence cannot make it rationally permissible for the individual to believe logical inconsistencies (intrapersonal nonpermissivism).

“还原证据主义”试图用理性的“实质性”规范（即对证据的反应性）来解释理性的所有“结构”要求——包括逻辑连贯性规范。虽然这种观点构成了对逻辑规范性来源的新颖看法，但我认为它面临着严重的困难。简而言之，我的论点是，假设拥有相同证据的个体可以有不同的理性反应（个人间宽容主义），该观点缺乏资源来维持其中心原则，即个人的证据不能使其在理性上得到允许让个人相信逻辑上的不一致（个人内部的非宽容主义）。