This article addresses a key topic in restructuring law, namely the alternative legislative rules for setting priorities for payments and rights among stakeholders in a statutory restructuring programme. The EU Member States have now implemented the Restructuring Directive (2019/1023), which gives two options for the priority rules and the outcomes of the new laws seem to vary significantly. As this legislation is important also for the efficiency of the capital markets, it is good to investigate the potential impacts the new legislative structures may bring for the process. In the article the author argues, by using the Coase Theorem, a leading theory in law and economics, that wider powers for a court to consider the interests of all parties in restructuring could be a preferable legislative solution to restructuring law. It would protect generally the creation of a restructuring surplus, as an individual class would be unable to use its rights as a tool for gaining further benefits. Relativity would stimulate the bargaining of property rights in the process and would follow the Coase Theorem, according to which bargaining between individuals or groups related to property rights will lead to an optimal and efficient outcome.

中文翻译：

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用科斯定理发展起来的重组相对论

本文讨论了重组法中的一个关键主题，即在法定重组计划中确定利益相关者之间的付款和权利优先顺序的替代立法规则。欧盟成员国现已实施重组指令（2019/1023），该指令为优先规则提供了两种选择，新法律的结果似乎存在很大差异。由于这项立法对于资本市场的效率也很重要，因此有必要调查新的立法结构可能会给这一过程带来的潜在影响。作者在文章中认为，运用法学和经济学领域的领先理论科斯定理，赋予法院更大的权力来考虑重组中各方的利益可能是比重组法更好的立法解决方案。它将普遍保护重组盈余的创造，因为个别阶级将无法利用其权利作为获得进一步利益的工具。相对论会刺激这一过程中的产权讨价还价，并遵循科斯定理，根据该定理，与产权相关的个人或群体之间的讨价还价将导致最优且有效的结果。