I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses public actions that affect the welfare of both players. I solve for the sender's optimal policy in closed form: the sender reports the value of the state with a delay that shrinks over time and eventually vanishes. Even when the receiver knows the current state, the sender retains leverage by threatening to conceal the future evolution of the state.

中文翻译：

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动态信息提供：回馈过去，引领未来

我研究在发送者和接收者之间的长期关系中信息的最佳提供。发送者观察到持续的、不断变化的状态，并承诺随着时间的推移向接收者发送信号，接收者依次选择影响双方福利的公共行动。我以封闭形式求解发送者的最优策略：发送者报告状态值的延迟随着时间的推移而缩小并最终消失。即使接收者知道当前状态，发送者也会通过威胁隐瞒状态的未来演变来保留影响力。