Rights offers are a relatively common capital-raising method. In a rights offer, the company's existing shareholders are given the opportunity to purchase newly-issued shares in proportion to the amount of shares they already own for a specific subscription price per share. Because all shareholders can participate in the issuance under the same terms, rights offers are often regarded as fair to all shareholders. However, this article demonstrates that rights offers do not always place shareholders on equal footing. In particular, this article shows that dominant, non-controlling shareholders (“insiders”) can utilize a rights offer to expropriate control. By setting a deliberately high subscription price, insiders can deter other shareholders from buying into the offer. Insiders can then purchase a disproportionate amount of shares via the rights offer, thereby securing absolute control. Once in control, insiders will be in a position to extract value from the firm, and will be immune to future control challenges. These expected benefits of control make the high subscription price worth paying from insiders' perspective, so that the rights offer is effectively underpriced for insiders but overpriced for other shareholders. When a rights offer acts as a change-of-control tool, it should be governed by Delaware takeover law. Courts should closely scrutinize such issuances, and require boards to maximize the premium insiders pay for control. This article further suggests that stock exchanges adopt a mandatory price-adjusting mechanism for rights offers, which will guarantee that the subscription price is lower than or equal to the underlying share's trading price.

中文翻译：

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通过供股控制征用

配股是一种比较常见的融资方式。在供股要约中，公司现有股东有机会以特定的每股认购价，按照其已拥有的股份数量的比例购买新发行的股份。由于所有股东都可以在相同的条件下参与发行，因此供股要约通常被认为对所有股东是公平的。然而，本文表明，供股并不总是使股东处于平等地位。特别是，本文表明，占主导地位的非控股股东（“内部人”）可以利用供股来征收控制权。通过故意设定较高的认购价，内部人士可以阻止其他股东购买该要约。然后，内部人士可以通过配股购买不成比例的股票，从而获得绝对控制权。一旦获得控制权，内部人员将能够从公司中获取价值，并且不会受到未来控制权挑战的影响。从内部人士的角度来看，这些预期的控制权收益使得高额认购价格值得支付，因此配股要约对内部人士来说实际上被低估了，但对其他股东来说却被高估了。当供股要约作为控制权变更工具时，应受特拉华州收购法管辖。法院应密切审查此类发行，并要求董事会最大限度地提高内部人士为控制权而支付的溢价。本文进一步建议证券交易所对配股实行强制调价机制，