In this paper, we investigate the association between the general managerial ability of CEOs and the readability of 10-K reports. We find that the readability of 10-K reports is lower for firms managed by CEOs with general managerial ability. Our result is robust to change analysis, an alternate readability measure, various fixed effects, an instrumental variable approach, a propensity score approach, and an entropy balancing approach. Our additional analysis reveals that general managerial ability is negatively associated with the readability of management discussion and analysis (MD&A). Moreover, the disclosure tone of 10-K reports and MD&A is conservative when firms are managed by generalist CEOs. Our findings also reveal that CEO tenure moderates the positive association between the general ability index and Gunning Fog index of 10-K reports. Finally, we find that high investment level and misstatement strengthen the association between the general ability index and the readability of 10-K reports, thus supporting the obfuscation hypothesis. We, therefore, conclude that firms incur costs in the form of lower disclosure quality when they opt for a generalist CEO.

在本文中，我们研究了首席执行官的综合管理能力与 10-K 报告的可读性之间的关联。我们发现，对于由具有综合管理能力的首席执行官管理的公司来说，10-K 报告的可读性较低。我们的结果对于变化分析、替代可读性测量、各种固定效应、工具变量方法、倾向评分方法和熵平衡方法是稳健的。我们的额外分析表明，综合管理能力与管理讨论和分析 (MD&A) 的可读性呈负相关。此外，当公司由通才首席执行官管理时，10-K 报告和 MD&A 的披露基调是保守的。我们的研究结果还表明，CEO 任期调节了 10-K 报告的一般能力指数和冈宁雾指数之间的正相关关系。最后，我们发现高投资水平和错报增强了一般能力指数与 10-K 报告可读性之间的关联，从而支持了混淆假设。因此，我们得出的结论是，当公司选择多面手首席执行官时，公司会因披露质量较低而付出成本。